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Policy Reform and Fathers’ Use of Parental Leave in Germany:  
The Role of Education and Workplace Characteristics 
 
 
Abstract 
The introduction of the parental leave benefit scheme in 2007 is widely regarded as a 
landmark reform that has shifted the German welfare state toward a model that is 
more supportive to the compatibility of work and family life. In this paper, we 
investigate whether and how this reform has affected men’s use of parental leave 
based on data from the German microcensus 1999-2012. We find that parental leave 
usage has increased across all educational levels, but the shift has been strongest for 
university-educated fathers. Public sector employment is beneficial for men’s uptake 
of leave, while self-employment and temporary work lowers fathers’ chances of 
taking leave. The parental leave reform has not affected these associations much.  
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Introduction 
Supporting gender equality and the equal participation of men and women in the 
labour market is a recurrent theme in the agenda of the European Union Commission 
of the European Communities (2005). It is, however, also clear that European 
governments have been largely concerned with increasing women’s labour market 
participation through measures such as the expansion of public child care, while 
policies that support a more equal division of household labour and that push men to 
take on childrearing obligations have not been adopted with the same enthusiasm. 
Only a few countries—notably, the Scandinavian countries—have a tradition of 
implementing policies that exert more direct influence on the involvement of fathers 
in childrearing. These policies include the creation of parental leave schemes with 
high income replacement rates coupled with proactive measures such as the so-called 
“paternity quota” (Sundström & Duvander, 2002).  
In 2007, Germany followed the Swedish example by enacting a radically new parental 
leave benefit scheme. The old parental leave benefit system, which included a 
monthly flat rate benefit of only €300, had been held responsible for the persistence of 
traditional employment patterns and regressive gender role behaviours among 
mothers and fathers in Germany (Gangl & Ziefle, 2009; Ondrich, Spieß, & Yang, 
1996). This system was abolished and was replaced with a system that was modelled 
on the Swedish system (Erler, 2009; Spieß & Wrohlich, 2008). The new system grants 
parents 65-67% of their previous net income, and includes particular incentives 
(frequently labelled “daddy months” or “paternity quotas”) for couples to share 
parental leave. The new regulations were seen as representing a radical shift in 
German family policies (Henninger, Wimbauer, & Dombrowski, 2008; Leitner, 
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Ostner, & Schratzenstaller, 2003; Spieß & Wrohlich, 2008). After long being 
described in cross-national comparisons as having a conservative welfare state regime 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999), Germany seems to have veered off its “established policy 
path” (Fleckenstein, 2011, p. 546). For many observers, it is still a puzzle that this 
landmark reform was enacted under the leadership of a family minister from the 
Christian-Democratic Party. Demographic concerns, and particularly Germany’s 
record-low birth rates, appear to have motivated conservative policy-makers to 
undertake this reform. Nevertheless, increasing maternal employment and providing 
incentives for fathers to use parental leave were also cited as primary objectives in the 
reform bill (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006, p. 2).  
Since the enactment of this reform, several attempts have been made to evaluate its 
impact on the demographic and employment behaviour of men and women in 
Germany. In fact, the German Family Ministry commissioned an evaluation of the 
reform (BMFSFJ, 2008, 2009). A major conclusion from these investigations has 
been that maternal employment rates have risen in response to the reform (BMFSFJ, 
2014; Kluve & Tamm, 2013; Reimer, 2013; Wrohlich, Geyer, & Haan, 2015). While 
the effect of the reform on maternal employment is largely undisputed, there is 
conflicting evidence on the effect of the reform on birth dynamics. (Western) 
Germany’s total fertility rate has remained rather stable at around 1.3-1.4 children per 
women for decades, but increased to 1.5 children in 2015. The recent increase could 
suggest a belated impact of the reform, but no firm evaluations of the effect of the 
parental leave benefit reform on fertility has been undertaken so far. The most 
significant shift seems to have occurred with respect to the behaviour of fathers. 
According to official statistics, the percentage of fathers among all benefit recipients 
has risen sharply, from less than five per cent before the reform to 26 per cent in 2014 
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(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017a). Among the children who were born in 2014, more 
than a third had a father who received parental leave benefit (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2017c). 
Recently, several quantitative studies have been conducted that also provide us with 
information about the socio-demographic characteristics of the fathers who are using 
leave (BMFSFJ, 2008; Reich, 2010; Trappe, 2013). These studies have reported that 
highly educated men are more likely than less educated men to use their parental 
leave entitlement. In addition, workplace characteristics—and particularly having a 
stable public sector position—have also been shown to play a role in fathers’ leave-
taking decisions (Pfahl & Reuyß, 2009). However, up to now there have been no 
representative studies that have compared fathers’ behaviour before and after the 
reform. Thus, the question of whether all population subgroups have reacted similarly 
to this reform, or whether particular groups have been more responsive than others, 
has remained unanswered. In this paper, we seek to close this research gap. We do so 
by extending prior research that was conducted with microcensus data and 
investigated the role of fathers’ education and the relative education of the partners in 
parental leave usage before the reform (Geisler & Kreyenfeld, 2011). This prior study 
examined whether highly educated men, who are generally assumed to be vanguards 
of involved fatherhood, would also be more likely to take leave than less educated 
men. The study did not find support for this claim which was explained by the high 
earning potential of highly educated men which “seems to draw them back into the 
labour market and away from being an ‘involved father’” (Geisler & Kreyenfeld 
2011: 96). In this paper, we expand these prior investigations and examine whether 
the parental leave reform of 2007 has resulted in a shift in the behaviour of highly 
educated men. Furthermore, we examine the role of workplace characteristics in 
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parental leave usage. Here, we particularly examine whether fathers in stable public 
sector employment and with permanent working contracts profited more strongly 
from the reform than fathers in the private sector or on temporary contracts.  
 
The German Parental Leave System 
West Germany introduced its parental leave system in 1986.1 Since its inception, both 
fathers and mothers have been entitled to take leave. The duration of parental leave 
was initially limited to a maximum duration of 10 months, and parental leave benefits 
were paid at a flat rate of DM600 (€307).2 Persons who could not use parental leave 
because they were unemployed or not in the labour force were also entitled to the 
                                                 
1  Since 1952, (West) German policies have included a maternity protection period of 14 weeks. 
Between 1979 and 1985, paid maternal leave was granted for working mothers for the period of 
six months after birth. During this time, only mothers were entitled to a benefit equivalent to 
their previous net income (with a ceiling of DM750 until 1983 and DM510 since then). East 
Germany introduced the “Babyjahr” in 1976 which was a year-long leave with a benefit equal to 
the level of sickness benefits. East German regulations granted only mothers the right to take the 
leave. Fathers were only eligible under certain circumstances.  
2  Since its introduction in 1986, the amount of “Erziehungsgeld” has remained fixed at a value of 
DM600 (€307 until 2003/ €300 from 2004-2006) per month and has never been adjusted for 
inflation. In order to put this into perceptive: Gross monthly earnings of a full-time employed 
industrial worker were around DM3,223 (€1,648) in 1986 (Statitisches Bundesamt, 1988, p. 
484). In 2006, monthly earnings for the same group of men were about €2,670 (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2007, p. 520). 
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same amount of benefit. High income earners were not or only partially eligible for 
the benefit if their income exceeded certain thresholds.3  
Since its introduction, the period of leave has been extended bit by bit. The first 
significant change in regulations was enacted in 1992, when the parental leave period 
was extended from 18 to 36 months. Germany thus had among the most generous 
parental leave entitlements in Europe at that time (Ray, Gornick, & Schmitt, 2010). 
With the extension of parental leave to 36 months, the duration of the parental leave 
entitlement and the duration of parental leave benefits no longer matched, as the 
benefit payments had not been extended to 36 months (see Table A1 for an overview 
of the parental leave regulations). 
The next major reform in 2001 introduced greater flexibility into the parental leave 
system as fathers and mothers were allowed to use parental leave simultaneously for 
the first time. Furthermore, parental leave was no longer restricted to parents with a 
child under age three, as parents were given the option of taking the maximum 
duration of three years of leave over the first eight years of the child’s life. In 
addition, the benefit of €300 per month could be increased to €450 if only 12 months 
of leave were taken. Although these new regulations provided parents with greater 
flexibility, the low benefit and the long duration of leave were increasingly seen as an 
ineffective tool for fostering women’s labour market integration and fathers’ 
                                                 
3  Couples whose annual net income exceeded DM29,400 (€15,031) were only eligible for the first 
six months of the benefit (Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz 06-12-1985, §5). This regulation was 
tightened over time. Starting in 2001, for example, couples whose yearly net income exceeded 
€51,130 were not eligible at all. Couples whose net income exceeded €16,470 were only eligible 
for six months (Neufassung Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz, 7-02-2001, § 5). However, if the 
recipient was not employed during parental leave his/her income was disregarded. 
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involvement with their young children (Budig, Misra, & Boeckmann, 2012). Many 
observers argued that the 2001 reform, which also included a renaming of the parental 
leave entitlement from “Erziehungsurlaub” (parental vacation) to “Elternzeit” 
(parental time) was a semantic shift rather than a serious policy reform (Bothfeld, 
2005, p. 14).   
Unlike these previous family policy adjustments, the parental leave benefit reform, 
enacted January 1, 2007, must be characterized as a landmark change. Most 
importantly, the reform included a radical change of the parental leave benefit system. 
Instead of receiving a flat rate benefit of €300, parents were granted 67 per cent of 
their prior net income while on leave. Compared to the Swedish role model, the 
German system is less generous. With 65-67 per cent of prior income, Germany 
provides a much lower income replacement than Sweden, which grants 80 per cent.4 
Furthermore, the German system includes an income cap for people who earn more 
than €2,700 per month, while benefits are topped-up for low-income earners.5 
Nevertheless, under the revised system parental leave benefits come much closer to 
replacing the parent’s income while on leave than under the previous system. While 
the parental leave duration (up to three years of parental leave) was left unchanged 
                                                 
4  In 2011, the replacement rate was reduced on a sliding scale to only 65% if the net monthly 
income exceeds €1,200. In addition, people with an annual household net income of more than 
€250,000 are not eligible for parental leave benefits (Bundeselterngeldgesetz 05-12-2006, §1, 
2). 
5  Parental leave payments are capped at €1800 per month. For low income earners (below €1000), 
parental leave benefits are topped up and can reach 100% of their prior income. Parents who are 
not employed (unemployed, not in the labor force, in education) are entitled to a benefit of €300. 
This was the same monthly payment as prior to the parental leave benefit reform; however, the 
maximum duration of payment was shortened from 24 to 12 months. 
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under the new regulations, the length of time during which the parental leave benefit 
could be collected was shortened: i.e., whereas previously the parental leave benefit 
could be collected for 24 months, the maximum duration was now 14 months. Two 
months of the leave benefit were reserved for each parent6 and would be lost if they 
were not used. This so-called “paternity quota”—which was occasionally ridiculed as 
the “Wickelvolontariat” (diaper-changing internship) in the German press—created 
the most direct incentive for fathers to use leave.  
 
Hypotheses: Differential Response to Policy Change 
As a result of the parental leave benefit reform of 2007, Germany moved away from 
having a flat-rate benefit system toward having an earnings-related benefit system. 
This policy shift has obviously altered the economic incentives for parents to take 
parental leave. Apart from unemployed men (who are not included in our 
investigation), all groups have seen an increase in the absolute amount of parental 
leave benefits. In addition, the “daddy months” create an additional incentive for 
fathers to take leave. All else being equal, one would assume that the probability of 
parental leave uptake has increased for all men after the reform (Hypothesis 1). 
Highly educated are generally assumed to be more likely to earn higher wages. As the 
parental leave benefits are now earnings-related, highly educated seem to have 
profited most from the reform. They may temporarily withdraw from the labour 
market and still receive a decent household income. Economic theory tells us, 
however, that decisions of this kind are not based on the absolute amount of benefits. 
Instead, the transfers during parental leave are weighted against the foregone income 
                                                 
6  Single parents are entitled to 14 months of the benefit. 
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and career opportunities in the labour market. Highly educated men face higher 
opportunity costs for taking leave than less educated men because of the higher 
income that is associated with more education. As higher earners usually pursue 
career tracks that are more sensitive to career interruptions, the opportunity costs of 
foregone income are also higher for this group of men. With the reform, the 
opportunity costs for using parental leave declined for all groups. However, high-
income earners benefited less in relative terms. The parental leave benefit covers only 
65-67 per cent of prior net income. Further, benefits are cut for men with a net 
monthly income of more than €2,700. Conversely, payments for men with a net 
income of less than €1,000 are topped up and the parental leave benefits may greatly 
exceed 67 per cent of prior income. As education and income are closely correlated, 
we would assume that a negative educational gradient not only persisted, but may 
have even become steeper after the reform (Hypothesis 2a).  
An alternative sociological view suggests that parental employment decisions are not 
influenced by economic determinants alone; instead, they are embedded in cultural 
and moral norms of appropriate behaviour for parents (Duncan, et. al. 2003). People 
make “care decisions” based on moral and socially negotiated views about proper 
behaviour, and these views vary by population subgroups. Less educated men are 
usually assumed to adhere to traditional gender roles, while the highly educated are 
seen as being at the forefront of a trend toward the greater involvement of fathers in 
childrearing (Juby & Le Bourdais, 1998; Sayer, Gauthier, & Furstenberg, 2004). 
However, they often fail to live up to these ideals as their high earnings pull them into 
employment and into the role of the male breadwinner (Kaufman & Uhlenberg, 
2000). The new parental leave benefit scheme does not provide full income 
replacement, but it allows men to temporarily step back from the role of a 
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breadwinner and lessens the tension between their ideals of involved fatherhood and 
the continued need to provide enough income to support the family. Against that 
background, we assume that highly educated men are more likely to embrace the new 
opportunities compared to less educated men. As a result, highly educated men are 
expected to have changed their behaviour more strongly following the implementation 
of the parental leave benefit reform than less educated men (Hypothesis 2b). 
Employment decisions are not made in isolation, but in the household context. 
A standard assumption is that the person in the household who can expect the higher 
labour market earnings is the most likely to work, while the other takes care of the 
child or the children. As education and income are closely related, we expect that men 
are more likely to take leave in cases in which they are less educated than their 
partners. Conversely, men who are more highly educated than their partners should be 
less likely to take leave. However, the contrasting, abovementioned argument about 
highly educated men being vanguards of modern gender role attitudes could also 
extend to an analysis that examines women and men’s combined education. Highly 
educated men who are partnered with less educated women might have wanted to use 
leave but  have had little leeway under the old system to act as involved fathers, 
because they need to provide for the household income. The newly introduced 
income-related benefit enables these fathers to step back from that role for a certain 
time to care for their children. Thus, we expect to see the highest increase in the 
probability to use parental leave after the reform among men with partners who are 
less educated than themselves (Hypothesis 3). 
Apart from education, workplace characteristics are important determinants of 
whether a father takes leave. Although all employees, regardless of their job status, 
have the right to use parental leave, men in more precarious or atypical employment 
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situations might be more reluctant to ask for leave. Fathers on temporary contracts 
may be worried that leave-taking may be regarded as a negative signal to the 
employer so that their working contract would not be renewed if they took leave. Self-
employed fathers might also be reluctant to make use of that option as they may fear 
losing their clients during leave. In general, the new regulations are primarily 
concerned with the details of income replacement but did not include any regulations 
that would have strengthened the rights of workers in precarious employment. After 
all, the regulations were targeted at workers with standard working contracts who are 
able to interrupt their employment after childbirth. Against this background, we 
assume that men on permanent contracts have been more likely than other men to take 
advantage of the new parental leave regulations (Hypothesis 4). 
Compared to the private sector, public sector employment is usually more 
conducive to the compatibility of family and work. The high prevalence of collective 
agreements provides a higher degree of job protection. Wages are usually set by 
collective wage agreements and are thus less subject to individual performance and 
negotiations. In addition, the public sector is usually non-profit so that a production 
loss due to the absence of an employee might be more accepted than in private 
companies (Bygren & Duvander, 2006, p. 365). Further, employees’ rights may be 
guarded to a higher degree in the public sector, as work councils are more established 
there than in private firms. Finally, part of the public sector employees are employed 
as civil servants (Beamte) who benefit from a privileged system of a right to life-long 
employment. Against this background, one would expect to find men who work in the 
public sector to be more likely to take parental leave than fathers who are employed in 
the private sector. It is less clear whether this association has strengthened after the 
reform. On the one hand, both private and public sector employees profited from the 
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reform as they both were subject to the same level of income replacement. On the 
other hand, private sector employees may have been reluctant to make use of the new 
options, as they may still fear that leave-taking is not accepted in their firms or that it 
may eventually be harmful for their career development. Against that background, we 
expect that public sector employees were more eager to embrace the new 
opportunities and took more leave after the reform (Hypothesis 5). 
  
Prior Studies on Fathers’ Parental Leave Usage 
The German parental leave system was largely copied from the Swedish system. The 
Nordic countries were, however, not only pioneers in the introduction of parental 
leave benefit schemes, but the large amounts of register data made available by these 
countries have greatly advanced empirical research in this area. Several studies for the 
Nordic countries have found that better educated men are more likely than less 
educated men to use parental leave (Lappegard, 2008; Sundström & Duvander, 2002). 
However, Sundström and Duvander (2002) only found a positive effect of men’s 
education when earnings were controlled for, and Bygren and Duvander (2006) 
reported no association between fathers’ education and the use of parental leave. It 
has also been shown that fathers with highly educated female partners are more likely 
to use parental leave than other fathers (Bygren & Duvander 2006; Duvander & 
Johansson 2010; Haas, Allard & Hwang 2002; Lappegard 2008). There are only few 
studies that investigated the effect of the relative education of the partners and the 
evidence is mixed. While Naz (2010) reported that men are more likely to take leave 
if their female partners have the same or a higher level of education, other studies 
found no differences (Duvander & Johansson 2010; Lammi-Taskula 2008). There is 
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consistent evidence that whether fathers use leave is heavily influenced by their type 
of occupation and the characteristics of their workplace (Bygren & Duvander, 2006; 
Haas, Allard, & Hwang, 2002; Naz, 2010). Bygren and Duvander (2006) showed that 
fathers who work in the public sector or in a larger company are more likely to use 
parental leave than fathers in the private sector or in a small company. Using Swedish 
survey data, Haas, Allard, and Hwang (2002) found that the organizational culture of 
a company is another vital factor in men’s parental leave usage. They showed that the 
perceived norms regarding overtime as well as the level of support from management 
greatly influence men’s decisions about whether to take leave. 
Studies for Sweden that have examined the effects of policy changes on men’s 
behaviour have found consistent evidence that fathers’ usage of parental leave 
increased after the implementation of the paternity quota in that country (Björnberg, 
2002; Duvander & Johansson, 2012). However, there is some dispute over how 
substantial and how durable the effect of the paternity quota has been. Duvander and 
Johansson (2012) compared the long- and short-term effects of the paternity quota in 
1995, and again in 2002 following the extension of the quota from one to two months. 
They further investigated the effectiveness of the gender equality bonus, introduced in 
2008, which provides tax credits for couples who share their parental leave equally. 
They found that the initial introduction of the paternity quota had the most pervasive 
influence on fathers’ use of leave, while the extension of the quota had a smaller 
effect. Their results further showed that the introduction of the gender equality bonus 
did not lead to any significant behavioural changes. Duvander and Johansson (2010) 
also investigated how different population subgroups responded to policy changes. 
They found that fathers with tertiary education were more likely to take leave than 
fathers with lower levels of education after the introduction of the paternity quota, and 
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identified a similar pattern for the gender equality bonus. However, they did not find 
that highly educated fathers responded differently than other fathers when the 
paternity quota was extended from one to two months. 
Until recently, there were very few studies for Germany on men’s use of parental 
leave. The few studies that existed were based on the results of qualitative interviews 
or attitudinal surveys that asked men, women and employers for their opinions 
regarding parental leave usage by fathers (Beckmann, 2001a, 2001b; Institut für 
Demoskopie Allensbach, 2005; Vaskovics & Rost, 1999). But following the reform of 
the parental leave benefit system, research in this area increased in tandem with the 
growing share of fathers using leave. A study commissioned by the Family Ministry 
(BMFSFJ, 2008) that investigated the behaviour of the fathers of children born in 
2007 found that the men’s educational level had a positive effect on their likelihood of 
taking parental leave. Using data from the German microcensus 2008, Reich (2010) 
reported that less educated as well as highly educated men had elevated chances of 
taking leave. Trappe (2013) investigated the effects of the couples’ education on the 
likelihood that the man would take leave, and found that the chances were strongly 
elevated when both partners were highly educated. Based on register data from two 
German states, she also examined the effect of earnings on the length of parental 
leave taken by the fathers of children born in 2007-2009. A finding is here that fathers 
who had a low income or who earned less than their female partners were especially 
likely to take a longer period of leave. A non-representative online survey by Pull and 
Vogt (2010) reported that earnings differences between the man and the woman are a 
good predictor of whether a father will take leave, but that these differences have no 
significant impact on the duration of leave. They also found that men who were better 
educated than their partners were less likely to use parental leave. There are only a 
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few large-scale representative studies for Germany that have examined the effects of 
workplace characteristics on leave-taking behaviour. Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2011), 
who examined the period before the reform, reported that being in public sector 
employment increases the likelihood that a father will take leave. This finding is in 
line with the results of a study by Pfahl and Reuyß (2009) in which they analysed the 
attitudes and experiences of men who took parental leave. A recent opinion survey 
has also confirmed that concerns about income loss and career setbacks are still the 
main barriers to fathers’ leave-taking  (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 2015, p. 
26). Although significant empirical evidence has amassed showing how fathers’ 
education and workplace characteristics influence fathers’ leave taking, none of the 
abovementioned studies for Germany has examined how patterns have shifted with 
the policy reform. 
 
Data, Variables, and Methods 
The data for this analysis come from the German microcensus which is a one per cent 
sample of the population living in Germany. We restricted the analysis to data from 
the years 1999 to 2012 because earlier microcensuses did not include precise 
information on the use of parental leave, and later microcensuses are not yet available. 
We further restricted the analysis to men between the ages of 18 and 55 who had a 
child under age three who was living in the same family unit. In principle, it is 
possible to use parental leave until the child’s eighth birthday; however, relatively few 
parents use the leave when the child is older than age three. We also excluded 
unemployed and inactive fathers from our sample. This may be seen as a drawback 
because the inactive and unemployed fathers are the only ones who did not see an 
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increase in parental leave benefit payments after the reform. However, our focus is on 
parental leave usage. Under the benefit scheme, unemployed and inactive fathers are 
eligible to receive parental leave benefit payments, but they are not eligible to take 
parental leave because they have not been working (either as an employee or as a self-
employed individual). In addition, we excluded the small number of single fathers and 
fathers in same-sex unions from the sample.  
The total sample size consisted of 125,100 respondents. Of these respondents, 1,205 
fathers, or 1 per cent of the study population, were on parental leave at the time of the 
interview. The fraction is higher after the reform (2%) than before the reform (0.5%). 
This can, however, not obscure that the values seem to stand in some contrast to the 
high shares of male parental leave benefit recipients regularly reported by the German 
Family Ministry. The reason for the seeming mismatch is that one of main indicators 
that the Statistical Office reports is the proportion of children for whom fathers have 
received the benefit (28% in 2012) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017a, 2017b). Since 
our data do not provide retrospective employment information, we take a snap-shot in 
time and estimate the probability that a father with a child aged 0-2 (the period 
parents are eligible to use leave) is taking leave at the time of the interview. There 
may be some fathers who have taken leave with a child, but because the time of leave 
was short, they might have already returned to work when the interview was 
conducted. Thus, our approach gives a correct account of the probability of being on 
parental leave at the time of the interview, but fathers with short leave durations are 
less likely to be captured as “leave takers” in our analysis. 
We use a binary logistic regression to study the probability that a father was 
on leave at the time of the interview. We are unable to allocate the parental leave 
usage to a particular child in the family. Here we assume that the father is on leave 
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with the youngest child in the household. One of the key independent variables in our 
analysis is the father’s education (categorized into no degree (low education), 
vocational degree (medium education), and university degree (high education)). We 
furthermore generated a variable that measures relative educational levels of the two 
parents (categorized into both no degree, both vocational training, both university 
degree, woman more highly educated than partner, man more highly educated than 
partner). Workplace characteristics are measured with two variables: the type of 
sector (public or private sector) and the type of contract (temporary, permanent, self-
employed). The control variables in the model are age, child’s age, number of 
children, region (eastern or western Germany), citizenship (German or non-German), 
and partnership status (married or cohabiting). Finally, a binary variable was created 
that indicates whether the youngest child was born before or after the enactment of the 
policy reform. The new parental leave benefit system came into force January 1, 
2007. Our data covers the years 1999-2012. The analytical sample includes men with 
children ages 0-2 at time of interview. Thus, we distinguish fathers whose youngest 
child was born 1996-2006 from fathers whose youngest child was born 2007-2012.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Our analytical strategy consists of two steps. First, we investigate the determinants of 
parental leave usage for the entire sample. In a second step, we explore whether the 
role of education and workplace characteristics in leave usage have changed over 
time. In this part of the analysis, we present models in which we interacted our 
independent variables with a dummy variable that distinguishes between fathers 
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whose children were born before the reform (1996-2006) and the period after the 
reform (2007-2012). Our key variables of interest are the father’s education, the 
relative education of the partners, and the workplace characteristics (type of contract 
and type of sector). 
 
Results 
Table 2 provides the results of the first part of the analysis. While Model 1 only 
includes individual characteristics, Model 2 also accounts for relative education. We 
look first at Model 1 and its control variables. As expected (see hypothesis 1), fathers’ 
uptake of leave increases after the reform. The model also indicates that foreigners are 
less likely to be on leave than Germans and that eastern Germans are more likely to be 
on leave than their western German counterparts. The latter finding corresponds to the 
results of prior research suggesting that eastern German men adhere to more 
egalitarian gender role ideals than western German men (Blohm & Walter, 2016). The 
model also finds a positive association between the father’s age and leave usage. The 
child’s age and the number of children are, as expected, negatively associated with 
leave usage. Men in non-marital unions are more likely to be on leave than fathers in 
marital unions. This finding contradicts the results of prior research for Scandinavian 
countries (Sundström and Duvander 2002), but it is in line with findings for Germany 
that the division of housework is more equal in non-marital than in marital unions 
(Lois, 2009). In line with our expectations, we find that workplace characteristics 
relate to fathers’ leave-taking behaviour. Men on temporary contracts and the self-
employed are less likely to use parental leave, while fathers employed in the public 
sector have a higher probability of being on leave compared to men working in the 
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private sector. Our key variable of interest is men’s level of education. We do not find 
large differences in leave-taking by level of education. For all educational groups, the 
probability of being on leave at the time of the interview is around 1 %.  
Model 2 includes the results for “relative education”. For most groups, the 
probability of a man being on leave is far below 1 %. There are two groups that stand 
out with higher chances of leave usage. On the one hand, this is the small share of 
men with a partner who had more education than they did. The second group consists 
of men with a university education who had an equally educated partner.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Our main research question is whether the determinants of leave usage have changed 
since the introduction of the reform. In order to investigate this question, we estimate 
models that include an interaction term that distinguishes fathers whose youngest 
child was born before the reform (years 1996-2006) and those whose youngest child 
was born after the reform (years 2007-2012). We have chosen a graphical 
representation to display the results of the interaction models. Figure 1 provides the 
results for fathers’ education. For the period 1996-2006, education and leave usage of 
fathers was largely unrelated. For all groups, the probability of being on leave at the 
time of the interview was only around 0.5%. After the reform, the probability of 
leave-taking increases for all groups. The largest effect can, however, be found for the 
university educated fathers, for whom the probability increases to 2.2 %. As a result, 
we find a positive educational gradient in leave-taking after the reform. These results 
support the idea that the new parental leave benefit system has encouraged highly 
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educated fathers in particular to take leave (see hypothesis 2b). As such, we must 
refute hypothesis 2a that has stated that highly educated men would also be less likely 
to take leave under the new system, because of the large income loss that they incur 
when on leave. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 2 presents the results for relative education. For both periods we 
observe a pattern similar to the pattern we saw in the initial model: i.e., men who are 
less educated than their female partners are more likely to take leave, while fathers 
who have more education than their female partners are the least likely to do so. Even 
after the reform, the latter group continued to be reluctant to take advantage of the 
leave benefits. However, we can still see that this group has changed their behaviour 
the most. Men who are more highly educated than their female partners are under 
economic pressure to act as breadwinners. Apparently, the new parental leave 
regulations have enabled some of these men to temporarily step back from their role 
as male breadwinner (see hypothesis 3).  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Figure 3 provides the results by type of contract. Compared to men on 
permanent contracts, self-employed men and men on temporary working contracts are 
less likely to be on parental leave. Although parental leave usage has become more 
common across all groups, the overall pattern has remained unchanged. Figure 4, 
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which displays the results by type of sector, provides a similar picture. It shows that 
leave usage is more common among public sector employees, both before as well as 
after the reform. The relative change is the same for both groups with an increase in 
the probability of leave taking by about 200%. This means that we have to refute 
hypothesis 4 and 5, which had stated that men on permanent contracts and in public 
sector employment would have been more likely to embrace the opportunities of the 
new parental leave benefit system.  
 
[Figure 3 & 4 about here] 
 
Summary and Discussion 
The aim of this paper was to evaluate men’s responses to the parental leave benefit 
reform that was enacted by the German government in 2007. In particular, we 
examined whether subgroups of men responded to the reform differently. We found 
that there has been a strong overall increase in fathers’ uptake of parental leave since 
the reform. This finding may not come as a great surprise. However, it is important to 
note that (West) German family policies have regularly been typified as familialistic 
and strongly biased towards the male breadwinner model. The features that led 
scholars to reach that conclusion are a system of joint taxation that heavily taxes the 
second earner, a childcare system that provided very limited care for small children 
and a population that employed the term Rabenmutter to emphasize that working 
women neglect their children. Against this background, some scholars viewed the 
new parental leave scheme as “alien” to the German system. Other considered it 
“premature”, assuming that these policies were being imposed ahead of real 
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behavioural changes (Lewis, 2001, p. 158; Lewis, Campbell, & Huerta, 2008; 
Schutter & Zerle-Elsäßer, 2012, p. 218). It could thus easily be assumed that the 
parental leave benefit reform would have been completely ineffective in changing 
behavioural patterns. The finding that parental leave usage increased for all the groups 
under investigation after the reform provides some evidence to refute this claim. It 
suggests instead that progressive family policies are able to change behavioural 
patterns also in conservative welfare state settings. 
Our investigations also showed that the increase in parental leave usage was 
greatest among highly educated fathers. While there was no educational gradient in 
leave taking before the reform, a positive gradient emerged afterwards. Furthermore, 
the increase in parental leave usage was highest among the men who were better 
educated than their female partners. This finding is at odds with the observation that 
the opportunity costs of leave-taking are largest for highly educated men, who should 
thus be less likely to use leave. It is, however, compatible with the observation that 
highly educated men express more liberal gender role attitudes and a greater 
commitment to get involved in the upbringing of their children. Yet this group of men 
were previously unable to live up to their ideals because their high earning power 
pushed them into the role of breadwinners. Although opportunity costs of parental 
leave usage are still relatively higher for men with high income, the German parental 
leave benefit reform provides an income replacement that enabled highly educated 
men to partially live up to their ideals of being an involved father.  
Our analysis also supports prior research that showed that workplace 
characteristics, sector of employment, and type of employment contract are important 
determinants of a father’s parental leave usage. Public sector employees were more 
likely than private sector employees to have taken leave before the reform, and this 
 23 
gap persisted after the reform. The same applies to self-employed men and men on 
temporary working contracts who are still more reluctant than men on permanent 
contracts to take advantage of parental leave regulations. These results underline that 
atypical work arrangements remain a strong barrier to leave-taking. The share of 
employees on temporary contracts has been growing steadily in recent years, but their 
particular situation is generally not reflected in family policy legislations. 
Although our paper provides novel evidence on how the parental leave benefit 
reform altered behavioural patterns in Germany, there are many caveats to be 
mentioned. One of the main findings is that highly educated men were those who 
most strongly expanded their usage of parental leave after the reform. Our 
interpretation of this finding is that high earnings used to push highly educated men 
towards the role of male breadwinners. The new system provides them the economic 
leeway to act according to their pronounced ideals of involved fatherhood. However, 
the microcensus does not survey attitudes nor does it provide suitable income data. 
Thus, our interpretation must be speculative as we were unable to carefully carve out 
the role of income and attitudes in leave-taking behaviour.  
In our analysis, we examined the probability to be on leave at the time of the 
interview. With our data, we were unable to examine the duration of leave. We also 
did not investigate whether fathers had previously taken leave. Thus, our approach is 
rather conservative as it only captures the men who were on leave at the time of the 
interview. In 2012, 82 percent of fathers who received parental leave benefits used 
leave for three or less months (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017a). From these data, it 
seems that short durations of leave are widely taken advantage of, while fathers 
refrain from taking long periods of leave. Because the characteristics of fathers who 
choose short and long durations of leave differ (Trappe, 2013), our results may 
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primarily reflect the characteristics of “long leave takers” who represent a smaller 
group among all fathers ever having taken leave.  
The introduction of the new parental leave benefit system was accompanied by a 
heated public debate. It is certainly possible that the public discourse triggered a 
process in which the societal norms that guide parental and gender role behaviour 
have shifted. Attitudinal surveys indicate that the proportion of people who embrace a 
more equal division of family responsibilities increased radically in (western) 
Germany between 2000 and 2012 (Blohm and Walter 2016: 428). It is also possible 
that the “daddy months” have incentivised fathers to take some leave while 
establishing a normative understanding that only short durations of paternal leave are 
appropriate. How societal expectations have shifted in response to the family policy 
reforms and how they tie into men’s behavioural changes could not be addressed with 
our approach. It must be left to future quantitative, and particularly qualitative 
research, to understand the normative forces that channel fathers into short and long 
durations of leave-taking.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Overview of Landmark Reforms in the German Parental Leave and 
Parental Leave Benefit System 
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Tables & Figures 
Table 1. Composition of the Sample by Year of Birth of Child, Column % 
1996-2006 2007-2012 Total
Region
Western Germany 87.5 84.3 86.5
Eastern Germany 12.5 15.7 13.5
Citizenship
German 86.5 88.2 87.0
Non-German 13.5 11.8 13.0
Age of respondent
Age 18-25 5.0 4.5 4.9
Age 26-30 18.7 17.8 18.4
Age 31-35 35.3 31.0 34.0
Age 36-40 27.6 27.5 27.5
Age 41-45 10.1 14.4 11.4
Age 46-55 3.4 4.8 3.8
Partnership status
Married 88.4 82.0 86.4
Cohabiting 11.6 18.0 13.6
Age of youngest child
Age 0 31.1 42.4 34.6
Age 1 35.0 33.9 34.7
Age 2 33.8 23.7 30.7
Number of children
One child 43.8 45.4 44.3
Two children 40.0 38.2 39.4
Three or more children 16.2 16.4 16.3
Education
No degree 12.4 12.9 12.6
Vocational degree 63.3 60.7 62.5
University 21.0 26.0 22.5
N/a 3.3 0.4 2.4
Type of contract
Temporary 7.2 8.6 7.7
Permanent 79.6 77.9 79.0
Self-employed 13.0 13.4 13.1
N/a 0.2 0.1 0.2
Sector of employment
Public 13.0 12.0 12.7
Private 87.0 88.0 87.3
Education & partner's education
Both no degree 8.0 7.1 7.7
Both vocational degree 50.3 46.5 49.1
Both university degree 10.1 15.3 11.7
Woman has lower education 19.5 18.6 19.3
Woman has higher education 7.7 12.0 9.0
N/a 4.3 0.6 3.2
Number of cases 86,805 38,295 125,100
Number of fathers on parental leave 449 756 1,205
Year of birth of child
 
Source: Scientific-Use-File of the German microcensus 1999-2012. 
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Table 2. Results from Logistic Regression Model, Average Predicted Probabilities 
(Av. Pr. Pr.), Dependent Variable: (1) Using Parental Leave (0) Not Using Parental 
Leave 
Av. Pr. Pr. Av. Pr. Pr.
Birth year of child
1996-2006 0.0055 0.0050 0.0060 0.0056 0.0051 0.0061
2007-2012 0.0175 0.0163 0.0188 0.0168 0.0156 0.0180
Region (Ref. Western Germany)
Western Germany 0.0093 0.0087 0.0098 0.0093 0.0087 0.0099
Eastern Germany 0.0118 0.0101 0.0134 0.0115 0.0099 0.0130
Citizenship (Ref. German)
German 0.0100 0.0094 0.0106 0.0100 0.0094 0.0106
Non-German 0.0062 0.0048 0.0076 0.0063 0.0049 0.0077
Age of respondent (Ref. 31-35)
Age 18-25 0.0053 0.0036 0.0071 0.0060 0.0040 0.0079
Age 26-30 0.0064 0.0054 0.0075 0.0067 0.0057 0.0078
Age 31-35 0.0104 0.0094 0.0113 0.0103 0.0093 0.0112
Age 36-40 0.0102 0.0090 0.0113 0.0098 0.0088 0.0109
Age 41-45 0.0128 0.0109 0.0147 0.0123 0.0105 0.0142
Age 46-55 0.0137 0.0103 0.0171 0.0137 0.0103 0.0171
Partnership status (Ref. Married)
Married 0.0093 0.0087 0.0099 0.0093 0.0087 0.0099
Cohabiting 0.0113 0.0098 0.0128 0.0113 0.0098 0.0128
Age of youngest child (Ref. Age 0)
Age 0 0.0151 0.0140 0.0163 0.0150 0.0139 0.0161
Age 1 0.0081 0.0073 0.0090 0.0082 0.0073 0.0090
Age 2 0.0043 0.0036 0.0050 0.0043 0.0037 0.0050
Number of children (Ref. O ne 
child)
One child 0.0120 0.0111 0.0130 0.0117 0.0108 0.0126
Two children 0.0083 0.0075 0.0091 0.0083 0.0075 0.0092
Three or more children 0.0064 0.0053 0.0075 0.0069 0.0057 0.0080
Education (Ref. Vocational degree)
No degree 0.0092 0.0074 0.0110
Vocational degree 0.0091 0.0084 0.0098
University 0.0111 0.0099 0.0122
Type of contract (Ref. Permanent)
Temporary 0.0057 0.0042 0.0072 0.0055 0.0041 0.0069
Permanent 0.0107 0.0100 0.0113 0.0108 0.0101 0.0114
Self-employed 0.0059 0.0047 0.0071 0.0056 0.0045 0.0068
Type of sector (Ref. Private)
Public 0.0134 0.0116 0.0152 0.0131 0.0113 0.0148
Private 0.0090 0.0085 0.0096 0.0091 0.0085 0.0096
Education & Partner's education 
(Ref. Both vocational degree)
Both no degree 0.0054 0.0036 0.0072
Both vocational degree 0.0084 0.0077 0.0091
Both university degree 0.0144 0.0126 0.0162
Woman has lower education 0.0065 0.0055 0.0075
Woman has higher education 0.0173 0.0150 0.0196
Model summary
Log likelihood starting model
Log likelihood
Pseudo R²
Number of cases
Number of fathers on parental leave
-6,193
0.0885
125,100 125,100
0.078
Model 1 Model 2
-6,794 -6,794
1,205 1,205
95 % Conf. Interval 95 % Conf. Interval
-6,263
 
Notes: Controlled for missing values in the variables “type of contract”, “education” and “education & 
partner's education”. 
Source: see table 1.  
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Figure 1. Results from Logistic Regression Model, Average Predicted Probabilities, 
Dependent Variable: (1) Using Parental Leave (0) Not Using Parental Leave, 
Interaction of Child’s Year of Birth and Education 
 
 
 
Notes: Controlled for: region, citizenship, age of respondent, partnership status, age of youngest child, 
number of children, type of contract, type of sector. 
Source: see table 1. 
 
 
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
No degree Vocational degree University degree
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f b
ei
ng
 o
n 
pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e
1996-2006
2007-2012
 32 
Figure 2. Results from Logistic Regression Model, Average Predicted Probabilities, 
Dependent Variable: (1) Using Parental Leave (0) Not Using Parental Leave, Interaction of 
Child’s Year of Birth and Relative Education 
0.0000
0.0050
0.0100
0.0150
0.0200
0.0250
0.0300
0.0350
Both no degree Both vocational
degree
Both university degree Woman < man Woman > man
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f b
ei
ng
 o
n 
pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e
1996-2006
2007-2012
 
Notes: Controlled for: region, citizenship, age of respondent, partnership status, age of youngest child, 
number of children, type of contract, type of sector. 
Source: see table 1. 
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Figure 3. Results from Logistic Regression Model, Average Predicted Probabilities, 
Dependent Variable: (1) Using Parental Leave (0) Not Using Parental Leave, Interaction of 
Child’s Year of Birth and Type of Contract 
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Notes: Controlled for: region, citizenship, age of respondent, partnership status, age of youngest child, 
number of children, education & partner’s education, type of sector.  
Source: see table 1. 
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Figure 4. Results from Logistic Regression Model, Average Predicted Probabilities, 
Dependent Variable: (1) Using Parental Leave (0) Not Using Parental Leave, Interaction of 
Child’s Year of Birth and Sector of Employment  
0.0000
0.0050
0.0100
0.0150
0.0200
0.0250
0.0300
Public sector Private sector
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f b
ei
ng
 o
n 
pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e
1996-2006
2007-2012
 
Notes: Controlled for: region, citizenship, age of respondent, partnership status, age of youngest child, 
number of children, education & partner’s education, type of contract 
Source: see table 1. 
  
